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Abstract
We estimate the effects of obesity on wages accounting for the workers’ sort-
ing into jobs requiring different levels of personal interactions in the workplace.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 combined
with detailed information about jobs from O*Net, we find a wage penalty for
obese white women. This penalty is higher in jobs that require a high level of
personal interactions. Accounting for job selection does not significantly change
the estimated wage penalty.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates how the relationship between obesity and wages is affected by
the level of personal interactions required in the workplace. A vast literature studies
how obesity affects labor market outcomes.1 In a seminal paper, Cawley (2004) finds
∗Moro : Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. Tello: Frank Batten School of Lead-
ership and Public Policy, University of Virginia. Tempesti: Department of Economics, University
of Massachussets at Lowell. Emails: andrea@andreamoro.net, sebastian.tello@virginia.edu,
TommasoTempesti@uml.edu. We thank Ekaterini Kiriazidou for providing software code that we
adapted to estimate one of our model specifications.
1See Averett and Korenman (1996), Cawley (2004), Pagan and Davila (1997), Register and
Williams (1990) and references therein.
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a negative effect of obesity on wages for white women. A possible explanation of this
effect is that obesity results in social stigma, affecting men and women differently
(the so-called “beauty premium”).2 To the extent that body weight affects a person’s
appearance, it may also affect other people’s perception of his or her labor-market
relevant traits.3 If the effect of stigma on wages is more prominent for workers
employed in jobs requiring frequent personal interactions, then obese workers may
more likely to self-select into jobs requiring fewer interactions. We study how this
self-selection affects the observed job-specific relationship between obesity and wages.
There exist at least two channels that may generate a weight penalty in jobs that
require personal interactions. One possibility is that overweight individuals, being
perceived as less attractive in the workplace, are discriminated against by co-workers,
customers, or employers who have a taste against interacting with individuals with
above normal weight (as in Becker (1957)’s theory of discrimination). In this case,
jobs that require more interactions display a stronger relationship between weight
and labor market outcomes. A second theory is that co-workers, customers, or em-
ployers statistically discriminate against overweight individuals (see Phelps (1972)).
According to this theory employers hold a (possibly biased) belief that overweight
workers are on average less productive, for example because they are less capable of
performing the productive tasks requiring interactions. If productivity is imperfectly
observed, body weight is used by employers as a proxy in order to improve workers’
2A growing literature (see Hamermesh and Biddle (1994)) documents the relationship between
wages and physical appearance, which is at the root of the “beauty premium” conjecture. Bhat-
tacharya and Bundorf (2009) offer an alternative explanation for the obesity wage penalty. Given
that obese workers have higher expected medical expenditures, they also have higher health insur-
ance costs. If these workers obtain health insurance from their employer, their employer will pass
some of these costs to the employee in the form of lower wages. They find supporting evidence for
this type of mechanism
3See Baum and Chou (2011) for an analysis of the socioeconomic causes of obesity. Another
explanation from the sociological literature is that obesity has a more adverse impact on the self-
esteem of white female than on that of other groups, but Averett and Korenman (1996) do not find
empirical support for such conjecture.
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job allocation. Therefore, individuals carrying a different body weight, but other-
wise identical, are treated differently. This (statistical) discrimination will be larger
in jobs requiring personal interactions. Both channels carry the same implication:
workers in jobs that require more interactions with customers or co-workers will be
more strongly affected by their appearance.
When the effects of weight on wages are economically relevant, workers may, de-
pending on their body mass, self-select into jobs requiring different levels of personal
interactions. Our contribution is to account for the endogenous selection of workers
into job types by adopting a job selection model to correct for the potential selection
bias occurring when selection is ignored.4
To this end, we merge two sources of data. The first one is the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of the Youth 1979, a nationally representative sample of men and
women aged between 14 and 22 when first interviewed in 1979. This dataset con-
tains detailed information about the respondents, including their weight, height,
employment status, occupation and wages. The second source of data is the O*Net
database, which classifies occupations according to hundreds of standardized descrip-
tors illustrating each occupations’ characteristics and the worker’s required skills.5
From this information we use factor analysis to construct a variable measuring the
level of personal interactions required by each occupation. We classify jobs in one
of two types, depending on whether the job’s level of personal interactions value is
above or below the median.
4Previous research has noted that people with different body mass choose different jobs. Han
et al. (2011), Morris (2006), while Harris (2017) examined the relationship between individuals’
weight and their employment decisions over the life cycle. Our contribution is to account explicitly
for the endogenous selection of people with different obesity into different types of jobs.
5O*Net provides for each occupation values to descriptors such as “Contact with Others” (How
much does this job require the worker to be in contact with others, face-to-face, by telephone,
or otherwise in order to perform it?), Face-to-Face Discussions (How often do you have to have
face-to-face discussions with individuals or teams in this job?), or Work With Work Group or Team
(How important is it to work with others in a group or team in this job?). The full set of descriptors
used in our analysis is listed in the Appendix B.
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The literature on the effects of obesity on wages typically regresses wages on
obesity status, using different statistical methods to identify the causal effect of
weight (usually fixed effects or instrumental variables techniques), accounting for the
possibility of reverse causality (i.e poorer individuals have less time and monetary
resources to eat healthy food, exercise, etc.). We complement this approach by
adopting a Roy model of self-selection.6 In this framework, workers of different body
mass may have a comparative advantage in performing different types of jobs. We
assume each person chooses between two types of jobs, requiring a high or low level
of personal interactions. Each job-type requires specific skills, which are distributed
differently among workers of different body mass. Workers select the job that gives
them the highest expected earnings. In the standard OLS regression of wages on
body mass index (BMI), ignoring this selection biases the coefficient on BMI, even
after controlling for job type. For example, obese individuals may disproportionally
find it more advantageous to seek employment in jobs requiring fewer interactions,
where obesity has less impact. Because we do not observe the wages that obese
workers would obtain in jobs requiring interpersonal interactions, a standard OLS
regression of wages on BMI would return a biased coefficient.
In our benchmark specifications our wage equation includes individual fixed ef-
fects to account for reverse-causality between obesity and wages, that is, the pos-
sibility that low-wages cause obesity (perhaps because poorer families have easier
access to fattening food), and the possibility that unobserved correlates affect both
obesity and wages.7 To correct for the selection bias, we model job selection with an
equation capturing the discrete choice between two job-types. Estimates from this
equation provide information about the selection bias in the wage equation. Results
6See Roy (1951) and Heckman (1990). Seminal papers in this empirical literature are Willis and
Rosen (1979), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), and Borjas (1987).
7This approach is adopted in Cawley (2004).
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from the selection equation are used, in a second stage, to unbiasedly estimate the
wage equation. We implement two different approaches. In one specification, we
adopt the two-step parametric method introduced by Willis and Rosen (1979) that
does not include fixed effects in the selection equation. In a second specification, we
use the methodology developed in Kyriazidou (1997) to include fixed effects in the
selection equation.
Although the coefficients can be identified out of the functional form, to im-
prove the identification of the bias correction, we include in the first stage a variable
that we believe affects the relationship between obesity and wages only through job
choice: the respondent’s closest siblings’ job type. The intuition for this exclusion
restriction is that individuals may find it easier, regardless of their obesity, to find
jobs requiring skills that are similar to the jobs of their family members, either be-
cause of direct referrals, or because family members correlate on other skills required
in the workplace.
Our results confirm, using up-to-date information, the literature’s result that the
negative relationship between obesity and wages is significant only in some demo-
graphic groups, notably white women. However, when accounting for job selection,
we see that the negative relationship between obesity and wages is mostly coming
from the subset of workers in jobs needing a high level of personal interactions. In
such jobs, the relationship is stronger than average, but similar to a regression that
does not correct for the selection bias. In jobs that require a lower level of personal
interactions, the relationship between jobs and wages is smaller and not statistically
significant.
Our analysis is most related to the research in Cawley (2004), Han et al. (2009)
and Shinall (2014). Cawley (2004) focuses on the effect of obesity on wages. To ac-
count for sources of bias, such as omitted variables and reverse causality, he follows
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different strategies: controlling for lagged values of BMI, using siblings’ weight as an
instrument for the respondent’s weight, and, in his preferred specification, includ-
ing individual fixed effects. However, he does not control for job type. Han et al.
(2009) introduce the use of job characteristics. They use data from the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (DOT - a precursor of O*Net, the database we use) to ob-
tain information about the jobs the individuals are performing. They find that the
association with BMI and wages is stronger for jobs that require more interpersonal
skills, but do not account for endogenous job selection. Finally, Shinall (2014) also
uses job characteristics to compare the effects of obesity on wages for that require
some physical skills versus jobs that require some social skills. However, in that
paper the data does not offer the possibility of controlling for individual fixed effects
and there is no specific accounting for selection bias in the wage-obesity estimation.
Our paper’s contribution relative to existing literature is to extend the analysis of
the literature of obesity on wages by (i) using a broad range of information on job
characteristics, and, most importantly, (ii) to explicitly model workers’ job selection
to verify if job sorting affects the magnitude of the effects of obesity on wages.
2 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth 1979 is a nationally representative
sample of the American youth. Respondents were sampled first in 1979 when they
were between 14 and 22 years of age, every year until 1994, and every two years
since. We use 12 years of data ranging from 1982 thru 2006.8 This is a widely used
8The years that we end up using for our sample are: 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992,
1993, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2006. We cannot use some of the survey years because the employment
status recode we use to match the data with the O*Net database was not created in 2000-2004, or
in 2008-present because the CPS section on activity in the week before the survey was not included
in those rounds. In addition, the survey does not include body weight information in some of the
years betweeen 1982 and 1998.
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survey in research on employment and obesity, allowing for comparability of our re-
sults with other studies. The survey contains detailed questions about employment
and tenure, household environment and structure, and personal health information
like height and weight. For the empirical analysis we use information on gender,
race, education status, marital status, number of children in the household, Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), age of youngest child, highest grade achieved by
mother and father, work tenure, years of experience, region dummies. We also gen-
erate dummies representing “missing” values for each of the variables to account for
different types of misreporting. The estimation sample includes 41,589 person-years
(19,175 person-years for women and 22,414 person-years for men) after excluding
women who were pregnant at the time of interview, individuals under the age of 18,
and individuals who did not have full employment or weight information. About
91 percent of our sample is employed, with on average 141 weeks of tenure at their
current job.
In order to construct the main dependent outcome we obtain information on the
hourly wage of each individual and then, as in Cawley (2004), we top-code the hourly
wage at $500. Wages are normalized to 2010 using the Consumer Price Index for
Urban Consumers. Our left hand side variable is the log of real hourly wages. Our
estimation sample shows that the average wage for men is $20.23 while the average
wage for women is $16.25. When focusing on the difference between normal weight
category and obese category, we estimate a wage differential of $-2.83 for women and
a $1.44 for men, i.e. obese men earn - on average - higher hourly wages than normal
weight men.
In order to calculate body mass index, we pool the responses for all years that
recorded self-reported weight. Height was assumed to be equal to the height recorded
in 1985, when respondents were between 20 and 27 years of age. We adopt the stan-
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Figure 1: Sample of Question about Importance and Level in O*Net
dard practice in this literature to correct weight and height for self-reporting error
using the procedure proposed by Lee and Sepanski (1995), exploiting the informa-
tion on the relationship between true and reported height and weight collected in
the National Health and Nutrition Survey. In our estimation sample the average
BMI is around 25.92 for women and 26.65 for males. Almost 22 percent of women
and about 21 percent of males in our sample falls in the obese or higher category.
We identified the respondents’ job in every year in which they are employed, as
well as the associated hours worked and the hourly wage received at each job. If
individuals are working multiple jobs, they report one of the jobs as their main job
and we use that information as their main source of employment. The NLSY offers
census occupation codes for all jobs. We use these codes to merge the NLSY data
with data from from the 2010 revision of the Occupational Information Network
(O*Net) database, which contains detailed information about job characteristics.
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For each job, the O*Net offers a description of tasks, tools and technologies,
knowledge, skills, abilities, work activities, work context and education required. For
each piece of information, the database reports two numerical values, “importance”
and “level”. The “importance” value is a number ranging from 1 to 5 representing how
how often the skill is used; the “level” is a number ranging from 1 to 7 representing
the expertise in skill needed to perform the job. For example, the skill “writing”
may be equally important for secretaries and journalists, but a professional writer
may need a higher level of writing skills. The database contains a total of 277 job
descriptors. Figure 1 reports, as an example, one of the questions which is relevant
to infer the importance and level of personal interactions required to perform the
respondent’s job.
We use information from the categories “skills” and “abilities” in O*Net to cal-
culate how important personal interactions are to perform any given job. We chose
17 work activities and job skills that, to our judgement, are most important for
discerning the important personal interactions. These questions assess how relevant
such interactions are to perform a job, to communicate with others (supervisors, co-
workers, or customers), to resolve conflicts or coordinate other individuals, to speak,
negotiate, coordinate others, etc. The full list of job descriptors we selected can be
found in Appendix B.
We used the “level” values for each task and skill; to reduce the dimensionality
of the information we used factor analysis to extract a single variable measuring
the degree of personal interactions required by each job.9 We use the median of
this standardized score for the entire sample as a threshold to categorize jobs in
two categories: those requiring high and low levels of personal interaction. In our
9We replicated the analysis using the “importance” indicators, which lead to similar results.
In our main specifications we use the “level” measure because it displays more variation than the
“importance” measure.
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Figure 2: Wages and BMI for different groups and job types
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estimation sample we find that 71% of women are occupied in jobs requiring a high
level of personal interactions, whereas only 60% of males are employed in these
job. In Figure 2, we plot the predicted logarithm wage across the different levels of
BMI for jobs requiring a high level of interactions versus jobs requiring low levels of
personal interactions for two groups, white women and white males.10
These figures illustrate several facts. First, jobs requiring interactions usually
pay higher wages than other jobs. Second, the relationship between BMI, wages,
and job-type is different between males and women. The relationship between wages
and BMI is close to linear for women, and decreasing in BMI; the same relationship
for males is non-monotonic. Finally, the wage-gap between jobs with high and low
levels of personal interactions for white women is decreasing in BMI, suggesting that
there is a higher penalty of BMI on wages for women in jobs requiring interactions,
presumably because weight and appearance is more important in such jobs. The
same penalty is not as evident for males’ wages as for women’ wages.
Figure 3 displays the distribution of BMI by type of job and gender. The BMI
distribution appears to display a smaller variance in jobs requiring more interactions,
suggesting the possibility of job selection which we will explore in the empirical
10The other race-gender groups can be found in Appendix C
10
Figure 3:
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3 Empirical framework
We now turn to describing our empirical strategy to account for the selection into the
different types of jobs. We assume that individuals can be employed in two types of
jobs j, requiring (j = 1) or not requiring (j = 2) a high level of personal interactions.
Let witj be the log wage of individual i at time t employed in job j ∈ {1, 2}, which
we assume to depend on a set of covariates Xit, including her or his obesity at time
t, BMIit, and, depending on the adopted specification, individual and time effects to
account for the possibility of reverse causality from wages to BMI:
witj = αjXit + ζi + jit (1)
Let Zit denote a set of observed variables that influence the job choice of individual i
at time t without affecting wages directly, and let Jit be a latent variable determining
11
the job-type choice of the individual. We assume the following job selection model:
Jit = βZit + ηi − 3it (2)
with job choice jit = 1 if Jit ≥ 0, and jit = 2 otherwise. Hence,
Pr(jit = 1) = Pr(3it ≤ βZit + ηi) (3)
Because individuals selects into different jobs according to their characteristics,
wages are not observed from a random sample of the population and an OLS regres-
sion of the wage equation with fixed effects delivers biased coefficients because:
E(wit1|jit = 1) = α1Xit + ζi + E(1it|jit = 1) = α1Xit + ζi + E(1it|3it ≤ βZit)
E(wit2|jit = 2) = α2Xit + ζi + E(2it|jit = 2) = α2Xit + ζi + E(2it|3it > βZit)
Procedures to account for the selection bias in linear models have been developed
since the seminal paper by Heckman (1979). We estimate the model (1-2) using two
different specifications that account for selection and, for comparison, we estimate a
specification that does not account for selection.
3.1 Specification without selection (OLS-FE)
First we include a standard specification which does not account for job selection. We
include fixed effects in the wage equation as in the preferred specification of Cawley
(2004), but separate the sample according to the type of job (high or low personal
interactions). Essentially, we estimate (1) for the sample of individual working in
jobs with high personal interactions and low level of personal interactions separately.
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3.2 Linear parametric specification with fixed effects in the wage
equation (WR)
In our first specification that accounts for selection we use the standard approach to
selection, and we include individual fixed effects in the wage equation (the second
stage). First, we assume joint normality of the error term vector [1, 2, 3], with zero
means and variance-covariance matrix Σ = [σij ]. This normality assumption allows
the computation of an analytical expression for the bias:
E(wit1|jit = 1) = α1Xit + σ13
σ33
φ
(
βZit
σ33
)
Φ
(
βZit
σ33
) (4)
E(wit1|jit = 2) = α2Xit + σ23
σ33
φ
(
βZit
σ33
)
(
1− Φ
(
βZit
σ33
)) (5)
where φ is the PDF and Φ is the CDF of a standardized normal distribution. These
equations can be estimated with the two-step procedure adopted in Willis and Rosen
(1979): first, estimate the probit model (3) and use the estimates to compute the
predicted values of the inverse Mills ratios11:
λˆ1it =
φ
(
ˆβZit
σ33
)
Φ
(
ˆβZit
σ33
) (6)
λˆ2it =
φ
(
ˆβZit
σ33
)
1− Φ
(
ˆβZit
σ33
) (7)
11See, e.g., Hogg and Craig (1995)
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Next, estimate the wage equations (1) by Ordinary Least Squares including λˆ1it and
λˆ2it to correct for the selection bias. The second stage then becomes:
ln(wit1) = α1Xit + ζi + γ1λˆ1it + 1it
ln(wit2) = α2Xit + ζi + γ2λˆ2it + 2it
The procedure provides consistent estimates of the parameter vector α.
In this approach identification of model parameters is guaranteed by the nonlin-
earity of the Mills ratios. However, non-parametric identification is usually preferable
if a variable is available that affects the selection equation without affecting the wage
equation directly. To this end, we include in Zit the closest sibling’s job type. We
motivate this choice with the assumption that, because jobs are often found through
family mentoring and networking, a sibling’s job type has a more direct effect on
the other sibling’s job selection than on her wages. This exclusion restriction will
improve identification of the parameter of interest, the coefficient on BMI.12
All specifications for the wage equation include as regressors the following vari-
ables: individual fixed effects, categorical BMI dummies, age, number of children,
age of youngest child, education, work tenure and experience, region dummies, mar-
ital status, mother’s education and experience
3.3 Specification with fixed effects in both the wage and the selec-
tion equations (K)
Our third and preferred specification adds one more complication, adding fixed effects
in both the selection and the wage equation. The standard procedure in estimating
12In order to identify the “closest” sibling of each individual we create a measure of distance
between each individual and all of their siblings. This measure is the sum of the squared difference
between the siblings’ age, race and gender. The “closest” possible sibling is one that has the same
age, race and gender.
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fixed effects models with panel data is to compute time-differences of the equation
of interest, which eliminates the individual fixed effects ζi. However, if the selection
equation also contains fixed effects, sample selectivity creates nonlinearities in the
wage equation that cannot be differenced out.
We therefore adopt the method proposed in Kyriazidou (1997) to account for
individual unobserved heterogeneous effects in both the selection and the wage equa-
tions. The procedure follows a two-step approach in the spirit of Heckman (1979), in
which the unknown coefficients of the selection equation (2) consistently estimated
in the first step are used to estimated the equation of interest 1 in the second step.
The wage equation is estimated with the usual procedure of taking time differences
of the observed variables as in standard linear panel data models, which eliminates
the fixed effects ζi. To account for sample selectivity, each observation is assigned
a weight computed in the first step. The procedure assumes that, for an individual
choosing job j in two consecutive periods, the selection effect remains the same if
the variables that determine the job choice do not change over time, in which case
the selection effect is completely eliminated by the time differencing in the second
stage. A Kernel weight is therefore computed as a function of the magnitude of the
estimated differences |wi,t+1βˆ − wi,tβˆ| so that a larger difference corresponds to a
smaller weight, where βˆ can is consistently estimated using a logistic model. In other
words, for a given individual, if we observe moves from different job types and no
change in BMI, then this observation will not receive too much weight in the wage
equation, as opposed to individuals who experience changes in both jobs and BMI.
In this specification we include the same covariates included in the previous
specifications, exdluding the parental variables that, not varying over time, are not
identified when fixed effects are included in the first stage.
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High personal interactions Low personal interactions
N × T N ln(w) N × T N ln(w)
Whites
Women 6,998 1,450 2.67 4,260 1,291 2.34
Men 6,514 1,358 2.96 6,145 1,475 2.59
Blacks
Women 2,384 584 2.52 2,560 667 2.26
Men 1,699 523 2.77 4,025 797 2.45
Hispanics
Women 1,763 389 2.61 1,210 341 2.31
Men 1,625 397 2.86 2,406 491 2.58
Table 1: Sample sizes and mean log wages
4 Results
In order to allow for appropriate comparisons, we use the same sample in all specifi-
cations.13 Common sample size and average wages for all specifications are reported
in Table 1, and descriptive statistics in Appendix A. As standard practice in the
literature, we look at the effect on wages of categorical values of BMI: individuals are
defined underweight if their BMI is below 18.5, overweight if their BMI is between
25 and 30, and obese if their BMI is greater than 30. The main results are reported
in tables 2 (Whites), 3 (Blacks), and 4 (Hispanics). In each table, columns 1, 2, and
3 reports the results for specifications 1, 2, and 3, respectively, as described in the
previous section. The tables display the effects of the categorical BMI levels (normal
BMI is the omitted category) on wages. The full set of coefficient estimates, includ-
ing results from the first stage regressions for specifications (1) and (2) are reported
in the external appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The
13An OLS regression that includes all observations available (including those without siblings’
information) produces somewhat different results, with bigger effects of obesity on wages. The
presence of siblings obviously affects family size, which in standard models of fertility is correlated
with human capital of the parents (and their children, if there is intergenerational transmission
of skills), and human capital may differentially affect the relationship between BMI and wages
(Sarlio-Lähteenkorva et al. (2004)).
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top panel of each table reports the estimates for women and the bottom panel for
men. In each panel we report the results for individuals in jobs that require high
levels of personal interactions and for individuals in jobs that require a low level of
personal interactions.
Taking a bird-eye view by looking for traction on the coefficients of the categorical
BMI variables across different groups and specifications, we note that abnormal BMI
has consistent statistically and economically significant effects only on white women
working in jobs requiring a high level of personal interactions. This group suffers
a wage penalty from being obese between 10 and 11 percent, depending on the
specification. The wage penalty associated from being simply overweight is smaller
in size, but significant and consistent across specifications.
The effect of abnormal BMIs on black and hispanic women in jobs with a high
level of personal interactions is in almost all specifications smaller in magnitude
and noisier, and rarely statistically significant. For black women who select into jobs
with high levels of personal interaction, we find in our preferred specification a strong
positive effect of being underweight. Since this result does not seem to be robust
across specifications, we take it to provide only suggestive evidence that there is a
premium for underweight black women among jobs that have high levels of personal
interactions. Overweight status is also associated with higher wages (relative to the
missing category, normal BMI). However this effect becomes less significant once
individual fixed effects are included in the selection equation.
The effects of abnormal BMI in women working in job with low levels of personal
interactions are generally smaller in magnitude for all racial groups. In the rare
cases when they are statistically significant, the results are not robust to different
specifications. For example, obese black women receive a wage premium of about
10 percent, in these types of jobs, barely significant at the 5 percent level according
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to specifications (1) and (2), but this result is reversed, but noisy in our preferred
specification (column 3). Looking at the results from the Hispanic women sample,
we don’t see any statistically significant effects of the categorical weight variables for
either type of job.
The effect of abnormal BMI on men is generally small and positive, but rarely
significant, and not robust to changing specifications. For example, we find sta-
tistically significant positive effects of being overweight in white males working in
jobs requiring high personal interactions. However, this effect is not robust to the
inclusion on individual fixed effects in the selection equation.
Comparing our results to existing literature, we confirm the previous findings of a
wage penalty on for obese white women, but not for other groups. However, we find
that these effects are stronger, and statistically significant, only in jobs requiring a
high level personal interactions. These patterns are consistent with the results from
Figure 2 and suggest that white women’s wage penalty for obesity is driven, in part,
by social stigma rather than productivity. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that appearance matters more in these types of jobs.
Finally, we note that accounting for selection, with or without including fixed
effects in the selection equation, has only modest effects on the estimated coefficients.
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Table 2: Effects of BMI on log wages for whites
Women (1) OLS-FE (2) WR (3) K
High personal interactions
Underweight -0.090∗ -0.107∗ -0.042
(0.042) (0.043) (0.049)
Overweight -0.063∗ -0.070∗ -0.075∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.037)
Obese -0.109∗ -0.109∗ -0.097∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.045)
Mills Ratio -0.359
(0.185)
Low personal interactions
Under weight -0.066 -0.066 -0.04
(0.050) (0.050) (0.054)
Overweight 0.003 0.003 -0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.044)
Obese -0.067 -0.067 -0.094
(0.050) (0.050) (0.081)
Mills Ratio -0.000
(0.000)
Men (1) OLS-FE (2) WR (3) K
High personal interactions
Underweight 0.030 0.032 -0.051
(0.077) (0.078) (0.225)
Overweight 0.051∗ 0.051∗ -0.025
(0.025) (0.025) (0.052)
Obese 0.049 0.045 -0.046
(0.040) (0.042) (0.077)
Mills Ratio 0.119
(0.215)
Low personal interactions
Underweight -0.098 -0.098 0.027
(0.123) (0.123) (0.101)
Overweight 0.043 0.043 0.104
(0.024) (0.024) (0.052)
Obese 0.017 0.017 0.04
(0.035) (0.035) (0.063)
Mills Ratio 0.000
(0.000)
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Table 3: Effects of BMI on log wages for blacks
Women (1) OLS-FE (2) WR (3) K
High personal interactions
Underweight -0.141 -0.147 0.205∗
(0.093) (0.094) (0.072)
Overweight 0.085∗ 0.074 -0.009
(0.041) (0.045) (0.075)
Obese 0.095 0.086 -0.074
(0.059) (0.059) (0.099)
Mills Ratio -0.178
(0.337)
Low personal interactions
Under weight -0.040 -0.040 -0.19
(0.068) (0.068) (0.102)
Overweight 0.056 0.056 0.001
(0.031) (0.031) (0.049)
Obese 0.098∗ 0.098∗ -0.094
(0.049) (0.049) (0.077)
Mills Ratio 0.000
(0.000)
Men (1) OLS-FE (2) WR (3) K
High personal interactions
Underweight 0.028 0.030 -0.024
(0.205) (0.200) (0.000)
Overweight 0.025 0.041 0.069
(0.050) (0.047) (0.033)
Obese 0.039 0.054 0.125∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.059)
Mills Ratio 0.310
(0.263)
Low personal interactions
Underweight 0.057 0.057 -0.132
(0.063) (0.063) (0.183)
Overweight 0.029 0.029 0.089
(0.025) (0.025) (0.044)
Obese 0.062 0.062 0.119
(0.041) (0.041) (0.066)
Mills Ratio 0.000
(0.000)
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Table 4: Effects of BMI on log wages for hispanics
Women (1) OLS-FE (2) WR (3) K
High personal interactions
Underweight -0.129 -0.317∗ -0.126
(0.084) (0.123) (0.091)
Overweight 0.012 0.057 0.014
(0.054) (0.058) (0.129)
Obese 0.015 0.124 -0.034
(0.088) (0.099) (0.131)
Mills Ratio -1.714∗
(0.686)
Low personal interactions
Under weight -0.084 -0.086 0.118
(0.070) (0.069) (0.101)
Overweight 0.030 0.031 -0.085
(0.037) (0.037) (0.053)
Obese 0.008 0.008 -0.071
(0.063) (0.063) (0.078)
Mills Ratio 0.000
(0.000)
Men (1) OLS-FE (2) WR (3) K
High personal interactions
Underweight 0.769 0.764 1.112
(0.406) (0.407) (0.814)
Overweight 0.012 0.015 -0.338∗
(0.058) (0.067) (0.117)
Obese 0.050 0.055 -0.199
(0.108) (0.113) (0.122)
Mills Ratio -0.070
(0.470)
Low personal interactions
Underweight -0.115 -0.115 -0.116
(0.074) (0.074) (0.047)
Overweight 0.014 0.013 -0.031
(0.026) (0.026) (0.037)
Obese 0.093∗ 0.093∗ -0.1
(0.044) (0.044) (0.054)
Mills Ratio -0.000
(0.000)
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5 Discussion
Our main results are consistent with the findings in Cawley (2004) and Han et al.
(2009) (see Table 5 for a comparison of their main results with our specification
(2)).14 Both of these papers find significant negative effects of obesity on wages for
white women, and the magnitude of these estimates is within the confidence interval
of our unadjusted estimates. Similarly, these papers do not find strong evidence for
the effects of obesity in males or black and hispanic minorities. This reinforces the
evidence for an obesity wage penalty occurring for white women, but not other race-
gender groups. Recall that while our data source is the same as in Cawley (2004)
and Han et al. (2009), differently from them, our sample only includes individuals
with siblings.
We find that most of the negative effect of obesity for white women is due to
women working in jobs requiring a high level of personal interactions. However, we
find suggestive evidence that weight causes women to sort into different types of jobs
and that this effect could be biasing the standard OLS downwards. These results
help validate previous findings on the estimation of BMI on wages since most of
those studies do not correct for selection into these types of job.
Focusing on white women, our results highlight that body mass is a relatively
more relevant factor in jobs requiring a high level of personal interactions, suggesting
that employers may consider looks in addition to productivty when it comes to jobs
that require high levels of personal interation.
This methodology has some limitations and one should interpret a causal inter-
pretation of the coefficients with caution. First, even though we are accounting for
14There are several differences across the different specifications: Cawley (2004) and Han et al.
(2009) do not include year 2006. Han et al. (2009) wage equations are conditioned on people who
are employed. Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009) use a blue collar dummy and several state and
local economic characteristics.
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Table 5: Comparison of our results with Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009)
Our results
Cawley Han et al. High Low High (K) Low (K)
(2004) (2009) OLS OLS Adjusted Adjusted
White women -0.087 -0.075 -0.109∗ -0.067 -0.097∗ -0.094
(0.015) (0.021) (0.047) (0.050) (0.045) (0.081)
Black women 0.002 -0.049 0.095 0.098∗ -0.074 -0.097
(0.017) (0.025) (0.059) (0.049) (0.099) (0.077)
Hisp. women -0.020 0.032 0.015 0.008 -0.034 -0.071
(0.024) (0.035) (0.088) (0.063) (0.131) (0.078)
White males 0.013 -0.001 0.049 0.017 0.046 0.04
(0.015) (0.017) (0.040) (0.035) (0.077) (0.063)
Black males 0.031 0.014 0.039 0.062 0.125∗ 0.119
(0.019) (0.027) (0.062) (0.041) (0.059) (0.066)
Hisp. males 0.023 0.008 0.050 0.093∗ -0.199 -0.10
(0.025) (0.032) (0.108) (0.044) (0.122) (0.054)
Coefficients on the category for “Obese” in each paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The specification in Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009) include individual fixed effects.
selection, there could be some unobservable time-varying components across indi-
viduals that would be biasing the effects of obesity on wages. Second, the variable
we exclude from the wage equation in the selection models could be correlated with
wages through some unobserved variable. Finally, we do not model the possible
changing intertemporal preferences of individuals that may vary with age and family
status, and could be affecting their employment decision. Despite these limitations,
our results extend the literature of obesity and wages by providing evidence that the
impact of BMI on wages depends on job types but not on sorting.
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A Appendix: descriptive statistics
Table 6: Summary Statistics of NLSY 1987-2006
Women Men
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic Total
Employment Variables
Employed 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.95
Hourly Wage in Dollars in 2010 $ 16.77 13.42 14.97 20.98 15.62 19.37 18.39
Ln(Wage) in 2010 $ 2.58 2.40 2.50 2.82 2.55 2.71 2.68
High personal interactions job 0.64 0.48 0.59 0.54 0.30 0.42 0.56
Tenure (weeks) 186.3 184.4 171.7 213.6 173.0 188.2 197.0
Currently in School 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10
Experience (1000s hours) 17.47 16.34 16.87 22.42 19.49 21.03 19.81
Body Mass Index
BMI Adjusted 24.63 28.20 26.35 26.22 26.32 26.95 25.76
Underweight (BMI < 18.5) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Overweight (25 < BMI < 30) 0.21 0.28 0.30 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.31
Obese (BMI: >30) 0.14 0.33 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.17
Demographics
Age 29.68 30.41 30.12 29.97 30.19 29.81 29.90
Highest Grade 13.67 13.17 12.53 13.35 12.50 12.14 13.35
Mother Highest Grade 11.78 10.33 7.99 11.54 10.10 7.45 11.24
Father Highest Grade 11.91 8.01 7.20 11.87 7.75 7.14 11.12
Number of Children 0.97 1.44 1.40 0.89 1.26 1.21 1.00
Age of Youngest Child 2.43 4.06 3.60 1.76 1.77 1.86 2.20
Never Married 0.29 0.47 0.28 0.38 0.53 0.41 0.36
Married 0.57 0.33 0.55 0.52 0.33 0.47 0.52
Separated 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03
Divorced 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09
Widowed 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 7: Summary Statistics of NLSY 1987-2006 for women
Underweight Normal Overweight Obese Total
BMI Adjusted 17.63 21.84 27.14 35.41 25.17
Employment Variables
Employed 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96
Hourly Wage in Dollars in 2010 $ 15.70 17.15 15.56 14.26 16.25
Ln(Wage) in 2010 $ 2.48 2.59 2.53 2.45 2.55
High personal interactions job 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.57 0.62
Tenure (weeks) 122.2 167.7 197.5 242.5 185.3
Currently in School 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.11
Experience (1000s hours) 11.40 15.79 18.90 21.54 17.30
Demographics
Age 26.86 28.80 30.71 32.58 29.80
Highest Grade 13.24 13.74 13.48 13.10 13.55
Mother Highest Grade 11.78 11.74 11.13 10.57 11.40
Father Highest Grade 11.35 11.67 10.85 9.90 11.17
Number of Children 0.88 0.90 1.24 1.39 1.06
Age of Youngest Child 2.07 2.20 3.20 3.84 2.70
Never Married 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.32
Married 0.42 0.53 0.59 0.52 0.54
Separated 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04
Divorced 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.11
Widowed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 8: Summary Statistics of NLSY 1987-2006 for Males
Underweight Normal Overweight Obese Total
BMI Adjusted 17.50 22.77 27.14 33.69 26.27
Employment Variables
Employed 0.84 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95
Hourly Wage in Dollars in 2010 $ 15.85 19.24 21.25 20.68 20.23
Ln(Wage) in 2010 $ 2.35 2.72 2.86 2.81 2.78
High personal interactions job 0.36 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.50
Tenure (weeks) 86.9 165.2 230.4 267.4 207.1
Currently in School 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.08
Experience (1000s hours) 10.75 17.56 24.17 28.90 21.98
Demographics
Age 25.45 28.08 30.98 32.90 29.99
Highest Grade 12.00 13.23 13.24 12.90 13.17
Mother Highest Grade 10.11 11.15 11.12 10.99 11.11
Father Highest Grade 9.86 11.23 11.13 10.59 11.07
Number of Children 0.45 0.76 1.07 1.24 0.96
Age of Youngest Child 0.45 1.16 2.01 2.81 1.76
Never Married 0.66 0.50 0.33 0.30 0.40
Married 0.24 0.40 0.57 0.59 0.50
Separated 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Divorced 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08
Widowed 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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B Appendix: job descriptors
We report below the set of abilities, skills and work activities we used to construct
the index that encompasses the level of personal interaction required on the job.
• Work Activities:
– Communicating with Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates
– Communicating with Persons Outside Organization
– Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships
– Assisting and Caring for Others
– Selling or Influencing Others
– Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others
– Coordinating the Work and Activities of Others
• Skills:
– Speaking
– Social Perceptiveness
– Coordination
– Persuasion
– Negotiation
– Instructing
– Service Orientation
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C Relationship between BMI and wages, other groups
Figure 4: Relationship between BMI and wages across race and gender groups
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